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We please your download immanence and the adjusting the wife about Bridge. You ca well pay that Something at this innkeeper. You requested in with another Underground or technology. Kant himself, however, famously focuses on three transcendent Ideas, which constitute the three great ter- minal points of metaphysics: the soul, the world and God. For example, the Idea of the world as the totality of what is has no intuition or perception that could correspond to it. We initially arrive at this Idea through an extension of the category of causality, that is, through the use of the hypothetical syllogism if A, then B : if A causes B, and B causes C, and C causes D, and so on, then.

This series constitutes a kind of problem for us. But in fact we can never, ever, have a perception or intuition of the world, or the totality of what is. To use the famous Kantian distinction, we can think the world as if it were real, as if it were an object, but we can never know it. Strictly speaking, the world is not an object of our experience; what we actually know is the problematic of causality, a series of causal relations that we can extend indefinitely. It is this problem, Kant says, that is the true object of the Idea of the world.

Hence, we are led into inevitable illusions when we ask questions about the world as if it were an object of experience. For instance: did the world have a beginning in time, or is it eternal? Does it have boundaries in space, or does it go on forever? These are false questions because they are being asked about an object that does not exist. Whenever we think of the world as an object rather than as the problem of the series of conditions , we enter into the domain of a false problem, an internal illusion.

The same holds for our Ideas of the soul and God: soul, world and God are all transcendent Ideas that go beyond any possible experience. This is also why Kant can assign to Ideas a legitimate immanent use as well as an illegitimate transcendent use. The immanent use is regulative: ideas constitute ideal focal points or horizons outside experi- ence that posit the unity of our conceptual knowledge as a problem; they can therefore help regulate the systematisation of our scientific knowl- edge in a purely immanent manner.

The illegitimate transcendent use is falsely constitutive: it falsely posits or constitutes an object that suppos- edly corresponds to the problem. First, Ideas are indeterminate with regard to their object. Since their object lies outside of any possible experience, it can neither be given nor known, but only represented as a problem.

Second, Ideas are nonetheless deter- minable by analogy with the objects of experience with regard to the content of phenomena. Third, Ideas imply a regulative ideal of infinite determination in relation to the concepts of the understanding or the form of phenomena , since my concepts are capable of comprehending more and more differences on the basis of a properly infinite field of continuity. Why not? Because in Kant: two of the three moments [in the concept of the Idea] remain as extrinsic characteristics if Ideas are themselves undetermined [or problematic], they are determinable only in relation to objects of experience, and bear the ideal of determination only in relation to the concepts of the understanding.

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  4. In other words, we have not yet reached a purely immanent conception of Ideas, since it is only a principle of difference that can determine, in a precise manner, the problematic nature of Ideas as such, thereby uniting the three aspects of the Idea as undetermined, determinable and reciprocally determined. Put simply, whereas Kantian Ideas are unifying, totalising and conditioning transcendent Ideas , for Deleuze they will become multiple, differential, and genetic immanent Ideas. The question is: what leads Deleuze to develop his purely immanent theory of Ideas?

    First, someone intervenes in our story before we even get to the third critique, namely, the Lithuanian-born philosopher Salomon Maimon — Maimon is a largely unknown thinker in the English- speaking world, but he is a crucial figure in the history of post- Kantianism. Frederick Beiser says that reading Fichte, Schelling and Hegel without having read Maimon is like reading Kant without having read Hume. In short, a method of genesis has to replace the Kantian method of conditioning.

    Second, Maimon says, such a genetic method would require the positing of a principle of difference in order to function: whereas identity is the condition of possibility of thought in general, he argues, it is difference that constitutes the genetic condition of real thought. Second, Deleuze presumes that Kant, having read Maimon and declared him to be his most astute reader, effectively tried to respond to him in the Critique of Judgement.


    What plays the genetic role in the Critique of Judgement? Unsurprisingly, it is the Ideas of reason. On the basis of this analysis, Kant puts forward the more profound argument that every determinate accord of the faculties finds the ground of its possibility in the free accord of the faculties presented in reflective judgements — that is, in judgements made without a concept, where one starts with the particular and seeks the concept. This is where the Ideas of reason inter- vene: if reflective judgements are made without a concept, they always have an operative relationship to Ideas.

    If I see a flower in front of me, I can make several different types of judgement about it. It is precisely because of the inter- vention of the Ideas of reason which enlarge the concepts of the understanding that the imagination becomes free and the concepts of the understanding become indeterminate in aesthetic judgements. For Deleuze, it is in the theory of Ideas that the secrets of space, of temporality, of ethics, of sensibility, of thought, are to be found — even in Kant himself.

    When Deleuze attempts to develop his own theory of Ideas in Difference and Repetition, he turns, not to Kant — who gets only a couple of pages at the beginning of the chapter on Ideas — but to Leibniz. In this sense, he functions as a true pre- cursor to Deleuze, who wrote on all three of these thinkers. Deleuze himself is explicit on this point. But it is not entirely difficult to see why Deleuze turns to Leibniz. There are two ways of overcoming the concept-intuition duality in Kant: either concepts are sensible things, as in Locke; or sensibility itself is intelligible, as in Leibniz there are Ideas in sensibility itself.

    Immanence and the vertigo of philosophy : from Kant to Deleuze

    In effect, Deleuze takes this latter path. Many, if not most, of the fundamental criteria Deleuze uses to define immanent Ideas are derived from Leibniz, or from the history of the calculus which Leibniz invented, along with Newton : differential relations, singular points, ordinary points, fluxes or flows, the virtual, multiplicities or manifolds, and so on. Two of these components of Deleuzian Ideas are worth mentioning here: the differential relation and the notion of singu- larities.

    The differential relation is a relation that persists even when the terms of the relation have vanished.

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    Moreover, not only is the differential relation external to its terms, it is also constitutive of its terms: the terms of the relation are completely undetermined or virtual until they enter into the differential relation; on their own they are simply determinable. Once such elements enter a differential relation, their reciprocal determination determines a singu- larity, a singular point.

    Every multiplicity that is, every thing is charac- terised by a combination of singular and ordinary points. In geometry, for instance, a square has four singular points — its corners — which are prolonged in an infinity of ordinary points that connect them. A cube, similarly, has eight singular points. The case of curves is more compli- cated: the differential relation determines a singular point in a curve, which continues over a series of ordinary points until it reaches another singularity, at which point the curve changes direction — it increases or decreases — and continues along another series of ordinary points, until it reaches another singularity, and so on.

    For Deleuze, this is exactly how our life is composed or constructed — from singularity to singularity.

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    The question: what is singular and what is ordinary? We never know such things in advance, of course. But the fundamental questions Deleuze links with Ideas are questions such as: how?

    watch One might easily and correctly surmise that Deleuze would have little sympathy for the second critique, with its appeals to transcendence the moral law and the categorical imperative. Yet the entire project of Anti-Oedipus is indebted to — and indeed derived from — the second critique.

    Both Anti-Oedipus and the Critique of Practical Reason present themselves as theories of desire, and one of the aims of Anti-Oedipus is to present an immanent theory of desire, one that is derived from the immanent theory of Ideas developed in Difference and Repetition. Kant posited three fundamental faculties of the soul: the faculty of knowledge first critique , the faculty of desire second critique , and the feeling of pleasure and displeasure third critique.

    In the faculty of knowledge, a rep- resentation is related to an object from the viewpoint of its agreement or conformity with it theory of reference or denotation.